Cybergovernance Reading List (2015-02-26)

Space Law Reading List (2015-02-26)

S. 431: Internet Tax Freedom Forever Act

S. 431: Internet Tax Freedom Forever Act was introduced by Sen. John Thune on February 10, 2015:

S.431 — Internet Tax Freedom Forever Act (Introduced in Senate – IS)
 

S 431 IS

114th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 431
To permanently extend the Internet Tax Freedom Act.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
February 10, 2015
Mr. THUNE (for himself, Mr. WYDEN, Mr. MCCONNELL, Mr. SCHUMER, Ms. AYOTTE, Mrs. MURRAY, Mr. SCOTT, Mrs. SHAHEEN, Mr. CRUZ, Mr. TESTER, Ms. MURKOWSKI, Mr. DONNELLY, Mr. BLUNT, Mr. LEAHY, Mr. RUBIO, Mr. MERKLEY, Mr. CRAPO, Mr. COONS, Mr. HELLER, Mr. MARKEY, Mr. BARRASSO, Mr. PETERS, Mr. PORTMAN, Mr. MORAN, Mr. BURR, Mr. BOOZMAN, Mr. KIRK, Mrs. CAPITO, Mr. DAINES, Mr. VITTER, Mr. GRASSLEY, Mr. ISAKSON, Mr. COATS, Mrs. FISCHER, Mr. ROBERTS, Mr. MCCAIN, Mr. GARDNER, Mr. TOOMEY, Mr. INHOFE, Mr. LEE, Mr. GRAHAM, and Mr. FLAKE) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance


A BILL
To permanently extend the Internet Tax Freedom Act.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the `Internet Tax Freedom Forever Act’.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
      (1) The Internet has continued to drive economic growth, productivity and innovation since the Internet Tax Freedom Act was first enacted in 1998.
      (2) The Internet promotes a nationwide economic environment that facilitates innovation, promotes efficiency, and empowers people to broadly share their ideas.
      (3) According to the National Broadband Plan, cost remains the biggest barrier to consumer broadband adoption. Keeping Internet access affordable promotes consumer access to this critical gateway to jobs, education, healthcare, and entrepreneurial opportunities, regardless of race, income, or neighborhood.
      (4) Small business owners rely heavily on affordable Internet access, providing them with access to new markets, additional consumers, and an opportunity to compete in the global economy.
      (5) Economists have recognized that excessive taxation of innovative communications technologies reduces economic welfare more than taxes on other sectors of the economy.
      (6) The provision of affordable access to the Internet is fundamental to the American economy and access to it must be protected from multiple and discriminatory taxes at the State and local level.
      (7) As a massive global network that spans political boundaries, the Internet is inherently a matter of interstate and foreign commerce within the jurisdiction of the United States Congress under article I, section 8, clause 3 of the Constitution of the United States.

SEC. 3. PERMANENT MORATORIUM ON INTERNET ACCESS TAXES AND MULTIPLE AND DISCRIMINATORY TAXES ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE.

    (a) In General- Section 1101(a) of the Internet Tax Freedom Act (47 U.S.C. 151 note), as amended by section 624 of the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (Public Law 113-235), is amended by striking `during the period beginning November 1, 2003, and ending October 1, 2015′.
    (b) Effective Date- The amendment made by this section shall apply to taxes imposed after the date of the enactment of this Act.

 

The White House: Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Lisa O. Monaco Strengthening our Nation’s Cyber Defenses

via The White House:

 

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Lisa O. Monaco Strengthening our Nation’s Cyber Defenses

**Remarks as Prepared for Delivery**

Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Lisa O. Monaco
Strengthening our Nation’s Cyber Defenses
The Wilson Center
Washington, D.C.
Tuesday, February 10, 2015

Good afternoon, everyone.  Thank you, Jane, for your kind words, for your leadership on national security, and to everyone here at the Wilson Center for hosting me today.  Some of you may not know this, but my very first job in Washington, I’m afraid to admit nearly 25 years ago, was working as a research assistant at the Wilson Quarterly—back when it was a quarterly, paper journal.  Now, like everything else in our world, the Wilson Quarterly is online and much more up-to-the-minute.  So today feels a bit like coming home.

Before I get to my main subject today, I’d like to say a few words about the terrible news of this morning.  With deep sadness, we have confirmed the death of Kayla Mueller, who had been held hostage by ISIL for more than a year.  Today, our hearts go out to her family, and my thoughts in particular are with her parents, Carl and Marsha Mueller, who have shown strength and dignity over many difficult months.  Kayla represented the best of us—she was a testament to the boundless human spirit, and her legacy of compassion will serve as an inspiration to all those who seek to make our world a more just place.  Her life reaffirms a clear truth:  that a hateful and barbarous terrorist group like ISIL will never overcome the basic decency and hope that dwells in the human heart.  And, as the President made clear, we will find and bring to justice the terrorists who are responsible for Kayla’s captivity and death—no matter how long it takes.

As President Obama’s Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Advisor, I brief him every morning on the most significant, destructive, and horrific threats facing the American people.  I am oftentimes, as the President reminds me, the “bearer of bad news.”  Since I began this job two years ago, I can tell you that an increasing share of the bad news I deliver is unfortunately on cyber threats.  In just the last nine months,  we’ve seen a growing list of high profile targets – Home Depot, JP Morgan Chase, Target, Sony Pictures, CENTCOM, and the U.S. Postal Service, to name a few.

We are at a transformational moment in the evolution of the cyber threat.  The actions we take today – and those we fail to take – will determine whether cyberspace remains a great national asset or increasingly becomes a strategic liability.  An economic and national security strength, or a source of vulnerability.

So today, I want to talk about the threat we face and the Administration’s approach to countering it, drawing on counterterrorism lessons learned from the last decade of war.

Let me start with the facts.  According to a recent U.S. Government assessment, cyber threats to our national and economic security are increasing in their frequency, scale, sophistication, and severity of impact.  The range of cyber threat actors, methods of attack, targeted systems, and victims are expanding at an unprecedented clip.

The pace of cyber intrusions has also ticked up substantially—annual reports of data breaches have increased roughly five-fold since 2009.  And the seriousness of those breaches is also rising, causing significant economic damage.

No one, it seems, is immune – from healthcare companies and universities to the tech industry, critical infrastructure, and entertainment sector.  Just last week, Anthem, one of the nation’s largest health insurance providers, announced that hackers had breached a database containing the personal information of 80 million customers and employees.  Inside the U.S. government, we know that state and non-state actors, terrorists, hackers, and criminals are probing our networks every day – seeking to steal, spy, manipulate, and destroy data.

At the state level, threats come from nations with highly sophisticated cyber programs, including China and Russia, and nations with less technical capacity but greater disruptive intent, like Iran and North Korea.  Several nations regularly conduct cyber economic espionage for the commercial gain of their companies.  And politically motivated attacks are a growing reality, as we saw with North Korea’s attack on South Korean banks and media outlets last year.

As for non-state actors, threats are increasingly originating from profit-motivated criminals—so-called hackers for hire—those who steal your information and sell it to the highest bidder online.  Transnational criminals use cyber as a vector for profit.  There are the ideologically motivated hackers or terrorists.  You have groups like Anonymous that thrive on creating disruptions on company’s websites and leaking personal information online.  You have groups like the so-called Syrian Electronic Army, which conducts cyber attacks in support of the brutal regime in Syria.

And then there is ISIL, which has harnessed social media for a propaganda machine that’s radicalizing and recruiting young people to their hateful message around the world.

Most concerning, perhaps, is the increasingly destructive and malicious nature of cyber attacks, as we saw with Sony Pictures Entertainment last fall.  This attack stole large amounts of data and rendered inoperable thousands of Sony’s computers and servers.  It was a game changer because it wasn’t about profit—it was about a dictator trying to impose censorship and prevent the exercise of free expression.  At bottom, it was about coercion, which the United States believes is unacceptable, and which is why we took the extraordinary step of publicly identifying North Korea as responsible for the attack and responded swiftly, imposing additional sanctions on Kim Jong-Un’s regime.

In short, the threat is becoming more diverse, more sophisticated, and more dangerous.

And I worry that malicious attacks like the one on Sony Pictures will increasingly become the norm unless we adapt quickly and take a comprehensive approach, just as we have in other contexts.  Which brings me to the counterterrorism model.

Now, to be sure, there are many differences that make it difficult to apply lessons learned from the counterterrorism experience to cyber.  For one, the private sector plays a more central role in spotting and responding to cyber incidents than they do in the counterterrorism realm, where the government largely takes the lead.

Having observed our Nation’s response to terrorism post 9/11 from three different perches in the U.S. government—at the FBI, as Assistant Attorney General for National Security at the Department of Justice, and now at the White House—I can tell you there are structural, organizational, and cultural shifts that were made in our government in the counterterrorism realm that also apply to cyber.  We need to develop the same muscle memory in the government response to cyber threats as we have for terrorist incidents.

Structurally, since 9/11 our government has done the hard work of breaking down walls in our counterterrorism agencies and bringing people together to share information so that we get the best possible assessment of the threat.  Whenever possible, we’re bringing partners together to share information and extend our operational reach.  This model has made our counterterrorism mission against an evolving enemy more effective and sustainable.

Like counterterrorism, meeting cyber threats requires a whole-of-government approach that uses all the appropriate tools available to us—including our global diplomacy, our economic clout, our intelligence resources, our law enforcement expertise, our competitive technological edge, and, when necessary, our military capability.  Those who would harm us should know that they can be found and will be held to account.

In the cyber context, we need to share threat information more broadly and coordinate our actions so that we’re all working to achieve the same goal—and we have to do so consistent with our fundamental values and in a manner that includes appropriate protections for privacy and civil liberties.  We need to sync up our intelligence with our operations and respond quickly to threats against our citizens, our companies, and our Nation.

Make no mistake.  Over the last few years, we have developed new and better ways to collaborate across all levels of government and with our partners in the private sector—including at the operational hubs in our government charged with monitoring threats, issuing warnings, sharing information, and protecting America’s critical infrastructure.

At the White House, we’ve taken steps to improve our policy response.  Last summer, following a rising number of breaches and intrusions to public and private networks, we created the Cyber Response Group, or CRG—modeled on the highly effective and long-standing Counterterrorism Security Group.  The CRG convenes the interagency and pools knowledge about ongoing threats and attacks and coordinates all elements of our government’s response at the highest levels.

Despite this progress, it has become clear that we can do more as a government to quickly consolidate, analyze, and provide assessments on fast-moving threats or attacks.  As President Obama said during the State of the Union last month, we will make “sure our government integrates intelligence to combat cyber threats, just as we have done to combat terrorism.”

So today, I’m pleased to announce that we will establish a new Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center, or CTIIC, under the auspices of the Director of National Intelligence.  Currently, no single government entity is responsible for producing coordinated cyber threat assessments, ensuring that information is shared rapidly among existing Cyber Centers and other elements within the government, and supporting the work of operators and policy makers with timely intelligence about the latest cyber threats and threat actors.  The CTIIC is intended to fill these gaps.

In this vein, CTIIC will serve a similar function for cyber as the National Counterterrorism Center does for terrorism—integrating intelligence about cyber threats; providing all-source analysis to policymakers and operators; and supporting the work of the existing Federal government Cyber Centers, network defenders, and local law enforcement communities.  The CTIIC will not collect intelligence—it will analyze and integrate information already collected under existing authorities.

Nor will it perform functions already assigned to other Centers.  It is intended to enable them to do their jobs more effectively, and as a result, make the Federal government more effective as a whole in responding to cyber threats.  CTIIC will draw on the existing Cyber Centers to better integrate their relevant expertise and information to improve our collective response to threats.

Of course, responding to today’s threat is only part of the task.  The real challenge is getting ahead of where the threat is trending.  That’s why the President’s National Security Strategy identifies cyber as a critical focus area to ensure we both meet the challenges of today and prepare for the threats we will face tomorrow.  The President’s new budget backs up this commitment with $14 billion to protect our critical infrastructure, government networks, and other systems.

And later this week, at Stanford University, President Obama and I and several Cabinet members will join hundreds of experts, academics, and private sector representatives for a first-of-its-kind summit to discuss how we can improve trust, enhance cooperation, and strengthen America’s online consumer protections and cyber defenses.

But to truly safeguard Americans online and enhance the security of what has become a vast cyber ecosystem, we are going to have to work in lock-step with the private sector.

The private sector cannot and should not rely on the government to solve all of its cybersecurity problems.  At the same time, I want to emphasize that the government won’t leave the private sector to fend for itself.  Partnership is a precondition of success—there’s no other way to tackle such a complicated problem.  It requires daily collaboration to identify and analyze threats, address vulnerabilities, and then work together to respond jointly.

To the private sector, we’ve made it clear that we will work together.  We’re not going to bottle up our intelligence—if we have information about a significant threat to a business, we’re going to do our utmost to share it.  In fact, within 24 hours of learning about the Sony Pictures Entertainment attack, the U.S. government pushed out information and malware signatures to the private sector to update their cyber defenses.  We want this flow of information to go both ways.

The private sector has vital information we don’t always see unless they share it with us, and the government has a unique capacity to integrate information about threats, including non-cyber sources, to create the best possible picture to secure all of our networks.

When companies share information with us about a major cyber intrusion or a potentially debilitating denial of service attack, they can expect us to respond quickly.  We will provide as much information as we can about the threat to assist companies in protecting their networks and critical information.  We will coordinate a quick and unified response from government experts, including at DHS and the FBI.  We will look to determine who the actor is and hold them to account.  And, as we respond to attacks, we will bring to bear all of the tools available to us and draw on the full range of government resources to disrupt threats.

I want to commend companies that have shown strong leadership by coming forward as soon as they identify breaches and seeking assistance so we can work together and address threats more rapidly—which is good for the company, good for the consumer, and good for the government.  Across the board, we’re tearing down silos, increasing communication, and developing the flexibility and agility to respond to cyber threats of the 21st century, just as we have done in the counterterrorism world.

Moving forward, as our lives become more and more dependent on the Internet, and the amount of territory we have to defend keeps expanding, our strategy will focus on four key elements.

First, we need to improve our defenses—employing better basic preventative cybersecurity, like the steps outlined in the Cybersecurity Framework announced last year, would enable every organization to manage cyber risk more effectively.  But even just employing basic cyber hygiene could stop a large percentage of the intrusions we face, so we’ve got to start by getting the basics rights.

Second, we need to improve our ability to disrupt, respond to, and recover from cyber threats.  That means using the full strength of the United States government—not just our cyber tools—to raise the costs for bad actors and deter malicious actions.

Third, we need to enhance international cooperation, including between our law enforcement agencies, so that when criminals anywhere in the world target innocent users online, we can hold them accountable—just as we do when people commit crimes in the physical world.

And fourth, we need to make cyberspace intrinsically more secure—replacing passwords with more secure technologies, building more resilient networks, and enhancing consumer protections online, to start with.

President Obama will continue to do everything within his authority to harden our cyber defenses, but executive actions alone will not be enough.  We need durable, long-term solutions, codified in law that bolster the Nation’s cyber defenses.  This is not, and should not, be a partisan issue.  The future security of the United States depends on a strong, bipartisan consensus that responds to a growing national security concern.  Everyone shares responsibility here, including the Congress.

In December, Congress passed important bills to modernize how the government protects its systems and to clarify the government’s authorities to carry out its cyber missions.  Today, we need the Congress to build on that progress by passing the package of cybersecurity measures that President Obama announced last month that encourage greater information sharing, set a national standard for companies to report data breaches, and provide law enforcement with updated tools to combat cybercrime.  And we look to Congress to pass a budget with critical funding for cybersecurity, including for DHS.  The Administration is ready to work with Congress to pass these measures as quickly as possible.

Cybersecurity is and will remain a defining challenge of the 21st century.  With more than three billion internet users around the world and as many as ten billion internet-connected devices, there’s no putting this genie back in the bottle.  We have to get this right.  Our prosperity and security depend upon the Internet being secure against threats; reliable in our ability to access information; open to all who seek to harness the opportunities of the Internet age; and interoperable to ensure the free flow of information across networks and nations.

But we are at a crossroads, and the clock is ticking.  The choices we make today will define the threat environment we face tomorrow.

All of us have a responsibility to act—to take preventative measures to defend our systems; to build greater resilience into our networks to bounce back from attacks; to break down silos and improve information sharing and the integration and analysis of threats; to pass cybersecurity legislation; and to ensure we take a comprehensive, whole-of-government approach to respond to cyber attacks, just as we do in other contexts.

These are hard and complicated issues.  But I’m confident that working together—government, industry, advocacy groups, the public, and Congress—our networks will be safer, our privacy protected, and our future more secure. I look forward to tackling these threats with all of you.  Thanks very much.

European Parliament resolution of 11 February 2015 on the renewal of the mandate of the Internet Governance Forum (2015/2526(RSP))

The European Parliament passed European Parliament resolution of 11 February 2015 on the renewal of the mandate of the Internet Governance Forum (2015/2526(RSP)) on February 11, 2015:

European Parliament resolution of 11 February 2015 on the renewal of the mandate of the Internet Governance Forum (2015/2526(RSP))
The European Parliament ,

–  having regard to its resolution of 23 June 2005 on the information society(1) ,

–  having regard to its resolution of 14 March 2006 on a European information society for growth and employment(2) ,

–  having regard to its resolution of 14 January 2008 on the second Internet Governance Forum(3) ,

–  having regard to the Declaration of Principles and the Plan of Action of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), adopted in Geneva on 12 December 2003,

–  having regard to the Commission communication entitled ‘Towards a Global Partnership in the Information Society: Translating the Geneva Principles into Actions’ (COM(2004)0480),

–  having regard to the Tunis Commitment and Agenda for the Information Society, adopted on 18 November 2005,

–  having regard to the Commission communication following the WSIS in 2006 (COM(2006)0181),

–  having regard to its resolution of 15 June 2010 on Internet governance: the next steps(4) ,

–  having regard to the NETmundial Multistakeholder Statement presented on 24 April 2014,

–  having regard to the Commission communication entitled ‘Internet Policy and Governance – Europe’s role in shaping the future of Internet Governance’ (COM(2014)0072),

–  having regard to the joint statement by the EU delegation to the Internet Governance Forum held from 2 to 5 September 2014 in Istanbul,

–  having regard to Rule 123(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas the purpose of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) is to carry out its mandate from the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) with regard to convening forums for democratic, transparent and multistakeholder policy dialogue;

B.  whereas the main role and function of the IGF is to discuss a wide range of issues related to internet governance and, where appropriate, to make recommendations to the international community;

C.  whereas on 20 December 2010 the UN General Assembly decided to extend the mandate of the IGF for a further five years;

D.  whereas the discussion and decision on renewing the mandate of the IGF further will take place in 2015 at the UN General Assembly;

E.  whereas Parliament sent an ad hoc delegation to the WSIS in 2005 and has done so for every annual meeting of the IGF since then;

F.  whereas the ad hoc delegations Parliament has sent have played a pivotal role regarding the promotion of European values and the interaction with civil society organisations and representatives of national parliaments present at these events, in cooperation with the Member States and the Commission;

G.  whereas the top priorities for the European Union during the ninth IGF held in September 2014, with the overarching theme ‘Connecting Continents for Enhanced Multistakeholder Internet Governance’, were: expanded internet access globally; maintenance of the internet as a global, open and common resource; non-discriminatory access to knowledge; greater accountability and transparency in the multistakeholder internet governance model; rejection of the idea of a state-controlled internet; and recognition that our fundamental freedoms and human rights are not negotiable and must be protected online;

H.  whereas on 27 November 2014 the EU transport, telecommunications and energy ministers approved the Council conclusions underlining the importance of a coordinated European position on internet governance and of support for strengthening the IGF as a multistakeholder platform;

I.  whereas in March 2014 the US Department of Commerce’s National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) announced its intention to transfer the internet supervision functions of the IANA (Internet Assigned Numbers Authority) to the global multistakeholder community before the expiry of the current contract between the NTIA and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) in September 2015; whereas a balanced solution for this transition has to be found in time and should result in a system that cannot be subject to capture and manipulation, thereby continuing to ensure a stable internet;

J.  whereas in April 2014 the NETmundial-Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the future of Internet Governance drew up a set of principles for internet governance and a roadmap for future development of the internet ecosystem;

K.  whereas growth related to the internet economy is forecast to be almost 11 % in the EU, with a contribution to GDP expected to rise from 3,8 % in 2010 to 5,7 % in 2016,

L.  whereas the internet constitutes a fundamental pillar of the Digital Single Market, and fosters, inter alia, innovation, growth, trade, democracy, cultural diversity and human rights;

M.  whereas in an open internet all the rights and freedoms that people have offline should also apply online;

1.  Calls on the UN General Assembly to renew the mandate of the IGF, and to strengthen its resources and the multistakeholder model of internet governance;

2.  Considers that, although the IGF will not adopt formal conclusions, the European Union’s responsibility is to support this process and to raise the impact of these exchanges in policy discussions, as it offers a positive and concrete context for the shaping of the internet’s future on the basis of a multistakeholder approach;

3.  Calls on the Member States and the EU institutions concerned to keep the IGF high on their agendas and to continue to support the IGF and its secretariat, and to contribute to the development of an efficient and independent organisation capable of exercising its mandate and contributing to the evolving model of internet governance;

4.  Stresses that Parliament should continue to participate in future IGF meetings with a substantial delegation in order to contribute effectively to formulating an EU approach on internet governance together with the Member States and the Commission;

5.  Stresses the need to improve internet access all over the world; underlines that the IGF should increase the inclusive participation of all stakeholders;

6.  Stresses that it is firmly committed to the multistakeholder model of internet governance; calls upon the Member States, the Commission and all relevant stakeholders to further strengthen the sustainability of this model by making actors and processes at national, regional and international levels more inclusive, transparent and accountable;

7.  Emphasises the importance of completing the globalisation of the internet’s core functions and organisations; welcomes the commitment made by the US Government in March 2014 for the transfer of stewardship over the IANA functions; emphasises the importance of the full accountability and transparency of ICANN;

8.  Underlines the existence of a firm deadline for completion of the negotiations on IANA functions that will provide a long-term solution for the stability and security of the internet, as in September 2015 the current agreement between ICANN and the US Government on the supervision of the IANA function will expire;

9.  Calls on the Member States and the Commission to increase their efforts to support the conclusion of this new timely agreement;

10.  Calls on the EU institutions concerned to propose the EU itself as a first international partner with ICANN as regards IANA functions, including a role on equal grounds with the US and other states in the affirmation of commitments that are currently regulating IANA services; considers this an important step in ensuring the complete neutrality of ICANN;

11.  Stresses that lessons can already be learnt from the fruitful exchanges held in the context of the IGF up to now, and can be acted upon, in particular as regards regulatory aspects of electronic communications, and data security and privacy issues; considers that further discussions are needed within the IGF on issues related to cybersecurity and cybercrimes, ranging from solutions to improve the security of critical infrastructures to giving the appropriate tools for secure communication to individuals and small businesses, notably e-authentication and encryption; underlines the need to secure an open and independent internet as a global, common resource, together with non-discriminatory access to knowledge in the future, based on the initiatives and needs of the stakeholders, as well as freedom of expression;

12.  Stresses that it is crucial to continue efforts to ensure legal protection of net neutrality, which is an indispensable precondition for safeguarding freedom of information and expression, boosting growth and jobs by developing innovation and business opportunities related to the internet and promoting and safeguarding cultural and linguistic diversity;

13.  Stresses that fundamental freedoms and human rights are not negotiable and must be protected both online and offline; regrets that some states attempt to curb the global connectivity of their citizens by censorship and other restrictions; strongly rejects the idea of a state-controlled internet and mass surveillance of the internet;

14.  Stresses the economic and social importance of online rights for privacy and of users’ control of their personal data; considers such rights to be fundamental for democracy, an open and neutral internet and a level playing field for businesses on the web;

15.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council, the Member States and the national parliaments.

(1) OJ C 133 E, 8.6.2006, p. 140.
(2) OJ C 291 E, 30.11.2006, p. 133.
(3) OJ C 41 E, 19.2.2009, p. 80.
(4) OJ C 236 E, 12.8.2011, p. 33.

Cybergovernance Reading List (2015-02-20)

Space Law Reading List (2015-02-20)

H.R. 810: National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2015

H.R. 810: National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2015 was introduced on February 9, 2015 by Steven Palazzo.  It passed the House on February 10, 2015. The TOC:

H.R.810 — National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2015 (Referred in Senate – RFS)

Beginning
February 11, 2015
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
TITLE I–AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS
SEC. 101. FISCAL YEAR 2015.
TITLE II–HUMAN SPACE FLIGHT
Subtitle A–Exploration
SEC. 201. SPACE EXPLORATION POLICY.
SEC. 202. STEPPING STONE APPROACH TO EXPLORATION.
`Sec. 70504. Stepping stone approach to exploration
SEC. 203. SPACE LAUNCH SYSTEM.
SEC. 204. ORION CREW CAPSULE.
SEC. 205. SPACE RADIATION.
SEC. 206. PLANETARY PROTECTION FOR HUMAN EXPLORATION MISSIONS.
Subtitle B–Space Operations
SEC. 211. INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION.
SEC. 212. BARRIERS IMPEDING ENHANCED UTILIZATION OF THE ISS’S NATIONAL LABORATORY BY COMMERCIAL COMPANIES.
SEC. 213. UTILIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION FOR SCIENCE MISSIONS.
SEC. 214. INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION CARGO RESUPPLY SERVICES LESSONS LEARNED.
SEC. 215. COMMERCIAL CREW PROGRAM.
SEC. 216. SPACE COMMUNICATIONS.
TITLE III–SCIENCE
Subtitle A–General
SEC. 301. SCIENCE PORTFOLIO.
`SEC. 803. OVERALL SCIENCE PORTFOLIO–SENSE OF THE CONGRESS.
SEC. 302. RADIOISOTOPE POWER SYSTEMS.
SEC. 303. CONGRESSIONAL DECLARATION OF POLICY AND PURPOSE.
SEC. 304. UNIVERSITY CLASS SCIENCE MISSIONS.
SEC. 305. ASSESSMENT OF SCIENCE MISSION EXTENSIONS.
`Sec. 30504. Assessment of science mission extensions
Subtitle B–Astrophysics
SEC. 311. DECADAL CADENCE.
SEC. 312. EXTRASOLAR PLANET EXPLORATION STRATEGY.
SEC. 313. JAMES WEBB SPACE TELESCOPE.
SEC. 314. NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE TELESCOPE DONATION.
SEC. 315. WIDE-FIELD INFRARED SURVEY TELESCOPE.
SEC. 316. STRATOSPHERIC OBSERVATORY FOR INFRARED ASTRONOMY.
Subtitle C–Planetary Science
SEC. 321. DECADAL CADENCE.
SEC. 322. NEAR-EARTH OBJECTS.
SEC. 323. NEAR-EARTH OBJECTS PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS.
SEC. 324. RESEARCH ON NEAR-EARTH OBJECT TSUNAMI EFFECTS.
SEC. 325. ASTROBIOLOGY STRATEGY.
SEC. 326. ASTROBIOLOGY PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS.
SEC. 327. ASSESSMENT OF MARS ARCHITECTURE.
Subtitle D–Heliophysics
SEC. 331. DECADAL CADENCE.
SEC. 332. REVIEW OF SPACE WEATHER.
Subtitle E–Earth Science
SEC. 341. GOAL.
SEC. 342. DECADAL CADENCE.
SEC. 343. VENTURE CLASS MISSIONS.
SEC. 344. ASSESSMENT.
TITLE IV–AERONAUTICS
SEC. 401. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
SEC. 402. AERONAUTICS RESEARCH GOALS.
SEC. 403. UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.
SEC. 404. RESEARCH PROGRAM ON COMPOSITE MATERIALS USED IN AERONAUTICS.
SEC. 405. HYPERSONIC RESEARCH.
SEC. 406. SUPERSONIC RESEARCH.
SEC. 407. RESEARCH ON NEXTGEN AIRSPACE MANAGEMENT CONCEPTS AND TOOLS.
SEC. 408. ROTORCRAFT RESEARCH.
SEC. 409. TRANSFORMATIVE AERONAUTICS RESEARCH.
SEC. 410. STUDY OF UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP IN AERONAUTICS RESEARCH.
TITLE V–SPACE TECHNOLOGY
SEC. 501. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
SEC. 502. SPACE TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM.
`Sec. 70507. Space Technology Program authorized
SEC. 503. UTILIZATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION FOR TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATIONS.
TITLE VI–EDUCATION
SEC. 601. EDUCATION.
SEC. 602. INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE NATIONAL SPACE GRANT COLLEGE AND FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM.
SEC. 603. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
TITLE VII–POLICY PROVISIONS
SEC. 701. ASTEROID RETRIEVAL MISSION.
SEC. 702. TERMINATION LIABILITY SENSE OF CONGRESS.
SEC. 703. BASELINE AND COST CONTROLS.
SEC. 704. PROJECT AND PROGRAM RESERVES.
SEC. 705. INDEPENDENT REVIEWS.
SEC. 706. COMMERCIAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PROGRAM.
SEC. 707. NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION ADVISORY COUNCIL.
SEC. 708. COST ESTIMATION.
SEC. 709. AVOIDING ORGANIZATIONAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN MAJOR ADMINISTRATION ACQUISITION PROGRAMS.
SEC. 710. FACILITIES AND INFRASTRUCTURE.
SEC. 711. DETECTION AND AVOIDANCE OF COUNTERFEIT ELECTRONIC PARTS.
SEC. 712. SPACE ACT AGREEMENTS.
SEC. 713. HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS.
SEC. 714. FULLEST COMMERCIAL USE OF SPACE.
SEC. 715. ORBITAL DEBRIS.
SEC. 716. REVIEW OF ORBITAL DEBRIS REMOVAL CONCEPTS.
SEC. 717. USE OF OPERATIONAL COMMERCIAL SUBORBITAL VEHICLES FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND EDUCATION.
SEC. 718. FUNDAMENTAL SPACE LIFE AND PHYSICAL SCIENCES RESEARCH.
SEC. 719. RESTORING COMMITMENT TO ENGINEERING RESEARCH.
SEC. 720. LIQUID ROCKET ENGINE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM.
SEC. 721. REMOTE SATELLITE SERVICING DEMONSTRATIONS.
SEC. 722. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY GOVERNANCE.
SEC. 723. STRENGTHENING ADMINISTRATION SECURITY.
SEC. 724. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR CONTRACTORS THAT HAVE COMMITTED FRAUD OR OTHER CRIMES.
SEC. 725. PROTECTION OF APOLLO LANDING SITES.
SEC. 726. ASTRONAUT OCCUPATIONAL HEALTHCARE.
SEC. 727. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ACCESS TO OBSERVATIONAL DATA SETS.

H.R. 726: Secure Data Act of 2015

H.R. 726: Secure Data Act of 2015 was introduced on February 4, 2015 by Rep. Zoe Lofgren:

H.R.726 — Secure Data Act of 2015 (Introduced in House – IH)

HR 726 IH

114th CONGRESS
1st Session

H. R. 726
To prohibit Federal agencies from mandating the deployment of vulnerabilities in data security technologies.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

February 4, 2015
Ms. LOFGREN (for herself, Mr. MASSIE, Mr. SENSENBRENNER, Mr. CONYERS, Mr. POE of Texas, Ms. DELBENE, Mr. POLIS, Mr. O’ROURKE, and Mr. NADLER) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Select Committee on Intelligence (Permanent Select), and in addition to the Committee on the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL
To prohibit Federal agencies from mandating the deployment of vulnerabilities in data security technologies.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the `Secure Data Act of 2015′.

SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON DATA SECURITY VULNERABILITY MANDATES.

(a) In General- Except as provided in subsection (b), no agency may mandate or request that a manufacturer, developer, or seller of covered products design or alter the security functions in its product or service to allow the surveillance of any user of such product or service, or to allow the physical search of such product, by any agency.

(b) Exception- Subsection (a) shall not apply to mandates authorized under the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (47 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.).

(c) Definitions- In this section–

(1) the term `agency’ has the meaning given the term in section 3502 of title 44, United States Code; and

(2) the term `covered product’ means any computer hardware, computer software, or electronic device that is made available to the general public.

Cybergovernance Reading List (2015-02-17)