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- NEW CITE: Jeffrey Rosen, “The Right to Be Forgotten,” Stanford Law Review Online 64 (February 13, 2012): 88.
- NEW CITE: Julie E. Cohen, “Privacy, Visibility, Transparency, and Exposure,” The University of Chicago Law Review, 2008, 181–201.
- NEW CITE: Andy Greenberg, This Machine Kills Secrets : How WikiLeakers, Cypherpunks and Hacktivists Aim to Free the World’s Information (New York : Dutton, 2012).
- NEW CITE: C. Dianne Martin, “Using the US Constitution to Frame the Governance of Cyberspace,” ACM Inroads 6, no. 1 (2015): 24–26.
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The EU Parliament has passed Resolution of 11 March 2015 on child sexual abuse online (2015/2564(RSP)):
European Parliament resolution of 11 March 2015 on child sexual abuse online (2015/2564(RSP)) The European Parliament ,
– having regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, of 20 November 1989, and the protocols thereto,
– having regard to Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union,
– having regard to Articles 7, 8, 47, 48 and 52 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,
– having regard to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, of 23 November 2001,
– having regard to the Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse, of 25 October 2007,
– having regard to Directive 2011/93/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA(1) ,
– having regard to the Europol report of 2014 on the Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (iOACTA),
– having regard to General Comment No 14 (2013) of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child on the right of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration,
– having regard to the EU Agenda for the Rights of the Child, adopted in February 2011,
– having regard to its resolution of 27 November 2014 on the 25th anniversary of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child(2) ,
– having regard to the Commission communication entitled ‘A special place for children in EU external action’ (COM(2008)0055),
– having regard to the EU Guidelines for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of the Child,
– having regard to the EU Strategy towards the Eradication of Trafficking in Human Beings 2012-2016, in particular the provisions on financing the development of guidelines on child protection systems and on the exchange of best practices,
– having regard to its plenary debate of 12 February 2015 on the fight against child sexual abuse on the internet,
– having regard to Rule 123(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,
A. whereas sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children, including child abuse images, constitute serious violations of fundamental rights, in particular of the right of children to the protection and care necessary for their well-being, as provided for by the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union;
B. whereas the child’s best interests must be a primary consideration when carrying out any measures to combat these offences, in accordance with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child;
C. whereas serious criminal offences such as the sexual exploitation of children and child abuse images require a comprehensive approach covering the investigation of offences, the prosecution of offenders, the protection of child victims and the prevention of this phenomenon;
D. whereas the internet can expose children to specific risks, through them being able to gain access, or being subjected, to child sexual exploitation material, or being subjected to cyber predators, the exchange of material on violence, intimidation, bullying or grooming; whereas this exposure of children to such risks is exacerbated by the widespread use of and access to mobile technology and the internet;
E. whereas the fight against child abuse on the internet should be integrated into a wider strategy addressing the overall phenomenon of child sexual abuse and exploitation, which still relates mainly to offline offences perpetrated through networks and individuals deliberately acting outside the internet area;
F. whereas in the online environment sexual exploitation may take various forms, with young people being persuaded, or forced, to send or post sexually explicit images of themselves, to take part in sexual activities via a webcam or smartphone, or to have sexual conversations by text or online, meaning that abusers and cyber predators can threaten to send images, videos or copies of conversations to the young person’s friends and family unless they take part in further sexual activity; whereas images and/or videos may continue to be shared long after the sexual abuse has stopped and remain freely available for anyone to view online, thus maintaining a constant risk of the victims beings re-victimised and stigmatised;
G. whereas the measures taken by Member States to prevent illegal online content have not always been effective enough;
H. whereas the investigative tools made available to those responsible for the investigation and prosecution of child sexual abuse online should take into account, inter alia, the principle of proportionality and the nature and seriousness of the offences under investigation, in line with EU and Member State law;
I. whereas the protection of minors in the digital world must also be addressed through the industry taking initiatives in order to assume its shared responsibility, including through education and training for children, parents and teachers with a view to preventing minors from accessing illegal content;
J. whereas, by reason of their international nature, child exploitation and child sexual exploitation online, which span hundreds of countries and their legal jurisdictions and law enforcement agencies, constitute an international problem which requires an international solution; whereas concerns must be raised over human traffickers using children without a legal identity, who are ‘invisible’ to the authorities, for sexual abuse online;
K. whereas, owing to the nature of the crime and the age of the victims, most areas of child sexual exploitation and abuse – to a greater extent than other forms of crime – suffer from chronic underreporting to law enforcement authorities; whereas, therefore, the available data on the number of crimes committed do not accurately reflect the extent of the problem; whereas, according to information provided by NGOs concerning web pages containing child abuse material, more than 80 % of the victims are aged younger than 10; whereas data from the International Association of Internet Hotlines show an increase in the number of infant victims of sexual abuse and in abuse of an extreme and sadistic nature;
L. whereas a large number of offenders use the Darknet, where they have established anonymous communities using hidden forums, website services, social networking platforms and storage providers dedicated to child abuse material, thereby enabling and facilitating practically untraceable sexual exploitation of children;
M. whereas many criminals use defensive measures such as encryption and other tools to secure their activities, posing a serious challenge to law enforcement investigations;
N. whereas NGOs reveal that just eight top-level distributors were responsible for 513 commercial child abuse material distribution brands in 2012, and that the 10 most prolific brands recorded in 2012 were all associated with a single top-level distributor;
O. whereas Directive 2011/93/EU on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography was due to be transposed by Member States by 18 December 2013, and whereas fewer than half of the Member States have fully implemented it so far;
1. Strongly emphasises that protecting children and ensuring a safe environment for their development is one of the primary objectives of the European Union and its Member States;
2. Stresses in the strongest terms that the rights and protection of children online must be safeguarded, and that steps must be taken to ensure that any illicit content is promptly removed and reported to law enforcement authorities, and that there are sufficient legal instruments for investigating and prosecuting offenders;
3. Considers that children’s personal data online must be duly protected and that children need to be informed in an easy and child-friendly way of the risks and consequences of using their personal data online; underlines the important changes the data protection reform will bring in order to further protect the rights of children online;
4. Stresses the need for a comprehensive and coordinated European approach in order to ensure consistency in policymaking and the resulting action, encompassing the fight against crime together with fundamental rights, privacy, data protection, cybersecurity, consumer protection and e-commerce;
5. Considers that further steps must be taken to combat cyber grooming, and that the Commission, together with national governments, civil society, social media companies, parents, teachers, social workers, child protection officers, paediatricians, and youth and children’s organisations must play an active role in raising awareness of this issue through defined guidelines, the exchange of best practices, the creation of social platforms for cooperation and the exchange of information on this subject with a view to identifying potential risks and threats to children;
6. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to launch an awareness campaign, involving all relevant actors, to empower children and support parents and educators in understanding and handling online risks and protecting children’s safety online, to support Member States in setting up online sexual abuse prevention programmes, to promote awareness-raising campaigns on responsible behaviour in the social media, and to encourage major search engines and social media networks to take a proactive approach to protecting child safety online;
7. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to take appropriate measures to improve and enhance children’s reporting of abuse, as well as the action taken in response to such reporting, and to consider setting up systematic direct reporting mechanisms; supports the development of hotlines for children where they can denounce abuse anonymously;
8. Stresses the need to improve international cooperation and transnational investigations in this area through cooperation agreements, and to strengthen cooperation among law enforcement authorities, including through Europol and the European Cybercrime Centre (EC3), with a view to investigating, dismantling and prosecuting child sex offender networks more effectively, while prioritising the rights and safety of the children involved;
9. Welcomes, in this connection, the joint initiative by the EU and 55 countries around the world – coming together in the Global Alliance against Child Sexual Abuse Online – aimed at rescuing more victims, ensuring more effective prosecution, increasing awareness and achieving an overall reduction in the amount of child sexual abuse material available online; calls on the Commission to report more regularly on the progress made through this Alliance; calls on the Member States to implement these recommendations at national level;
10. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to foster and strengthen the resources dedicated to victim identification and victim-centred services, and calls for the setting-up of related platforms as a matter of urgency and for the strengthening of existing platforms within Europol;
11. Calls on the Member States to implement Directive 2012/29/EU on establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime;
12. Believes it is essential to use the correct terminology for crimes against children, including the description of images of sexual abuse of children, and to use the appropriate term ‘child sexual abuse material’ rather than ’child pornography’;
13. Encourages the Member States to properly resource the national contact points in order to enable them to report criminal and harmful online content and conduct, as provided for in Directive 2011/93/EU on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography;
14. Recalls that Member States are required to take the necessary measures to ensure that people who fear they might commit any of the offences related to sexual abuse and sexual exploitation have access, where appropriate, to effective intervention programmes or measures designed to evaluate and prevent the risk of such offences being committed;
15. Asks that the Member States’ law enforcement authorities and Europol be provided with the necessary funds, human resources, investigative powers and technical capabilities to seriously and effectively pursue, investigate and prosecute the offenders, including appropriate training to build capacity in the judiciary and police units and to develop new high-tech capabilities to address the challenges of analysing vast amounts of child abuse imagery, including material hidden on the ‘dark web’, in order to trace and prosecute the offenders so as to protect the safety and rights of children;
16. Notes with concern the development and expanding trends of commercial sexual exploitation of children online, including new means of distribution and transaction for child abuse materials, notably through the Deep Web and the Darknet, and in particular the phenomenon of live streaming of abuse for payment; calls on the Commission and the Member States, therefore, to further engage with representatives of alternative payment systems in order to identify opportunities for better cooperation with law enforcement authorities, including common training on better identification of payment processes linked to the commercial distribution of child abuse material;
17. Calls for an effective partnership approach and lawful information exchange between law enforcement agencies, judicial authorities, the ICT industry, internet service providers (ISPs), internet host providers (IHPs), social media companies, the banking sector and NGOs, including youth and children’s organisations, with a view to ensuring that the rights and protection of children online are safeguarded and that any illicit content is promptly removed and reported to law enforcement authorities, which should regularly report on their investigations and prosecutions based on this relevant information, where appropriate; welcomes, in this connection, the CEO coalition for making the internet a better place for kids, as well as the work of the European Financial Coalition against Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children Online (EFC);
18. Stresses that illegal online content should be removed immediately on the basis of due legal process; highlights the role of ICT, ISPs and IHPs in ensuring the fast and efficient removal of illegal online content at the request of the responsible law enforcement authority;
19. Strongly urges those Member States that have not yet done so to transpose Directive 2011/93/EU on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography; calls on the Commission, therefore, to strictly monitor its full and effective implementation, and to report back to Parliament, and its committee responsible, on its findings in a timely manner;
20. Instructs its Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs to further monitor the implementation of Directive 2011/93/EU and to carry out an in-depth analysis of the current policy framework for the fight against child sexual abuse, in the form of an implementation report on Directive 2011/93/EU, and to report back to the plenary;
21. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council and the parliaments of the Member States.
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From the United Nations in Geneva:
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT CONCLUDES HIGH-LEVEL SEGMENT; DISCUSSES PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACEHears Address from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Finland9 March 2015
The Conference on Disarmament this afternoon was addressed by the Foreign Minister of Finland, thus concluding its annual High-Level Segment. The President of the Conference on Disarmament, Vaanchig Purevdori of Mongolia, then invited States to discuss the agenda item on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. China also made a statement regarding general issues, including the revitalization of the Conference.
Erkki Tuomioja, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Finland, said the stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament remained a serious concern; there was a real risk it would be side-lined. An expansion of membership would enhance its legitimacy and inclusiveness as would recognition of the beneficial contribution of civil society and academia in today’s world. Finland welcomed the convening of a Conference on Disarmament Civil Society Forum week.
In the discussion on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, States considered the merits of the updated draft Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects submitted by Russia and China. Some States supported the immediate commencement of negotiations, while others voiced reservations, saying a new legally binding instrument needed to be comprehensive, precise and verifiable. The European Union encouraged States to support its proposal for an International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, which it was committed to commence negotiations on in 2015. States also discussed the merits of transparent confidence-building measures, space debris and the development and testing of destructive anti-satellite weapons.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Finland, as well as China, Pakistan, Latvia on behalf of the European Union, United Kingdom, Russia, United States, Belarus, France, Italy, India and Indonesia took the floor.
The Conference on Disarmament will next meet in public at 10 a.m. on Tuesday, 10 March to discuss negative security assurances. It will also hear an address from a representative of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, to commemorate International Women’s Day.
Meeting summaries of previous Conference on Disarmament plenaries can be found here. . . .
. . . Discussion on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space
Pakistan said with the ever-growing use of outer space by an increasing number of States both for civilian and military purposes, the potential and risk of its weaponization could not be ruled out. The issue of ‘Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space’ (PAROS) had been on the Conference’s agenda for over three decades: the time was ripe to commence negotiations on a legally binding treaty. Pakistan was party to all of the five core multilateral treaties governing the peaceful uses of outer space and a member of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, which had an important role in maximising the benefits of space capabilities in the service of humanity, particularly in the fields of environment, health and disaster mitigation. Pakistan asked States opposed to the commencement of negotiations on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space in the Conference the reasons for their opposition. Those States should acknowledge their responsibility in perpetuating the Conference’s deadlock by preventing the start of negotiations on an issue which did not undermine the security interests of any State, said Pakistan. It also welcomed the laudable and pioneering initiative of Russia to announce its political commitment that it would not be the first to place weapons in outer space.
Latvia, speaking on behalf of the European Union, said today the space environment faced significant challenges stemming from the proliferation of dangerous orbital debris which increased the likelihood of destructive collisions, the crowding of satellites, inter alia, in geo-stationary orbit, the growing saturation of the radio-frequency spectrum as well as the threat of deliberate disruption or destruction of satellites. The Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space was essential for strengthening strategic stability. The European Union attached great importance to the development and implementation of transparent confidence-building measures as a means of strengthening security and ensuring sustainability in the peaceful uses of outer space. The European Union encouraged States to support its proposal for an International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, which it was committed to commence negotiations on in 2015. The European Union was concerned by the continued development of all anti-satellite weapons and capabilities, including terrestrially based, and underlined the importance of addressing such developments. The European Union noted the submission in 2014 by China and Russia of an updated draft Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects but maintained reservations on it, saying a new legally binding instrument would need to be comprehensive, precise and verifiable. Regarding the General Assembly resolution on No-First Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the European Union believed that the very idea of “not to be the first to place” was ambiguous and may entice States to be the second or third.
United Kingdom said space security encompassed traditional security issues as well as those associated with socio-economic stability. Severe disruption to the information received, transmitted or collected by satellites could pose a significant security and economic risk to all countries. Security and emergency services would find coordinating and communicating with deployed personnel or emergency response vehicles much more difficult. The ability to monitor, warn of and react to threats as diverse as international humanitarian crises, natural disasters, severe weather events and even terrorist attacks would be seriously curtailed. Today there were more than 60 States and entities operating over 1,000 satellites in outer space. The Earth’s upper atmosphere was becoming increasingly congested and hard to manage. The impact of an arms race in outer space on global stability and prosperity had to be considered. Measures to improve transparency and increase confidence among States were an essential foundation for any future negotiation. The United Kingdom cited broad questions that had emerged in informal discussions on the Prevention of an Arms Race In Outer Space. They included what approach should be taken to building a framework governing behaviour in Space; the merits of a definitional approach and a ban on specific technologies, versus a behavioural approach to control specific actions; and whether we were too focused on weapons being stationed in Space when certain countries were actively developing and testing ground based weapons systems with the sole aim of destroying Space assets.
Russia said that the annual adoption of the United Nations General Assembly resolution on the Prevention of an Arms Race In Outer Space, submitted in turn by Egypt and Sri Lanka, was in essence adopted by consensus, which showed the exclusive interest in those issues and the desire to see them settled in the near future. The placement of weapons in outer space would radically change the international situation. Strategic stability would be destroyed because space weapons were global in scope and capable of covert and surprise attacks on any point on the planet at any point in time. Given their highly selective nature, space weapons would certainly be used. The risks of such a scenario were ever more probable given developments in science and technology. Outer space lacked legal protection against becoming a possible arena for those weapons. Russia, China and other like-minded States had consistently advocated for the agreement of an international legally-binding instrument to maintain global stability and ensure peace and security for all. Russia was aware of the criticism directed at the updated draft Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects but noted that it was difficult to find any international treaty which completely satisfied all demands upon it. Definitions of the use of force or threat of use of force had been limited exclusively to ‘intentional activities which aimed to create harm in outer space’. Russia also said it was prepared to work in the context of other initiatives, and had been an active and constructive participant in European Union-initiated activities on a draft International Code of Conduct for Outer Space. However, progress would only be achieved through fully fledged negotiations with the participation of all interested States on the basis of a clear mandate under the auspices of the United Nations.
United States said the legacy of success in space brought new challenges. Outer space was becoming increasingly congested from orbital debris and contested from human threats that endangered the space environment. Therefore it was essential that all nations worked together to preserve the domain for use by future generations. The United States was especially concerned about the continued development and testing of destructive anti-satellite weapons. The world had seen the long-lasting environmental effects of China’s intentionally destructive 2007 direct-ascent anti-satellite missile flight-test that generated long-lived debris in low Earth orbit. China’s July 23, 2014 non-destructive flight-test of an anti-satellite missile interceptor designed to destroy satellites in low Earth was also troubling, said the United States. China was not the only one pursuing those capabilities, said the United States, recalling that Russian leaders openly asserted that the Russian armed forces had anti-satellite weapons and conducted anti-satellite research. The revised draft Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT) submitted by Russia and China remained flawed for numerous reasons, including its lack of verifiability, failure to address terrestrially-based anti-satellites and potential for a break-out capability. The United States was convinced that challenges could and should be addressed through practical, near-term initiatives such as a non-legally binding transparency and confidence-building measures to encourage responsible actions in and the peaceful use of outer space. With the recent decision to convene negotiations later this year, the United States looked forward to working with the European Union and the broader international community in an inclusive multilateral process to finalize a Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities.
Belarus said it was important to develop a system of international measures to increase transparency, confidence and safety in outer space, suggesting that such transparency and confidence building measures would not plug the existing gaps in the current outer space legislation. Belarus supported the concrete proposals aimed at ensuring outer space remained a peaceful place, and proposals aiming to develop international legal agreements with the prohibition of the weaponization of outer space as their objective. The joint draft Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects proposed by Russia and China was the most acceptable way to do so. However, some States in the Western Group were not in favour of specific substantive discussions on issues in the context of this subject, said Belarus. Many Western Group countries preferred to talk about different nuances relating to the peaceful use of outer space and often Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space discussions focused on space debris. It would not be appropriate if many States which were not in favour of fissile material discussions to talk about the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency and so on remarked Belarus.
France said space security called for a global response incorporating civilian and military aspects. It was in everyone’s interest to promote the principle of the responsible use of space, not least for future generations. France shared the objective of avoiding an arms race in outer space and was not in principle opposed to negotiating instruments to that end. It noted Russia and China’s efforts to promote discussions in the Conference on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. However, France’s position on the necessary positions for formulating a legally binding instrument was that it should be comprehensive, precise, universal and credible. Those conditions were not self-evident. It was difficult to define some fundamental terms, said France, and there was a need to formulate precise conditions, considering the complexity of formulating a credible verification process. The rapid deterioration of the space environment needed measures could be urgently promoted, and for that reason France supported the formation of transparent confidence-building measures, whether of a technical or political nature. France expressed its full support to the European Union for the draft International Code of Conduct for Outer Space activities, which met fully the objective of building security in space.
Italy said it was fully committed to actively participate in discussions on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space and promoting international efforts to ensure the peaceful use of outer space. Italy also welcomed the 2013 report of the Governmental Group of Experts on the issue, which was approved by the United Nations General Assembly by consensus. Italy strongly supported the ongoing efforts of the European Union to promote a draft International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities and supported the comprehensive scope of the draft code which was applicable to military as well as civilian activities. The project complemented other initiatives, said Italy, noting the concern expressed by some countries that such a voluntary instrument would not be fully effective. Italy believed that such voluntary agreement could in fact pave the way for a legally binding instrument once its practicability had been established. Italy was committed to achieving an International Code of Conduct for Outer Space activities in 2015.
China initially responded to the remarks made by the United States, saying it was incorrect to categorize its tests as ‘anti-satellite’ when in fact some were anti-missile tests, while others were for the exploration of outer space for peaceful purposes. Some of China’s tests were not dissimilar to those conducted by the United States, it also noted. The Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space was a priority for China. Preventive diplomacy needed to be exercised to curb the looming threat of an arms race in outer space. Last year China and Russia presented to the Conference on Disarmament the joint draft Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (CD/1985). China said the updated version included an additional protocol on verification measures, as well as provisions for transparency and confidence-building measures. It would be advisable to put aside contentious issues such as verification in order to adopt an internationally binding instrument, said China. The draft treaty banning the placement or use of weapons in outer space meant that possessing, storing or stockpiling such weapons would be meaningless. Crucially the treaty would totally prohibit the use of force against space objects which would naturally cover anti-satellite weapons, so even if a State party possessed such weapons they could never use them.
India said it had emerged as a major space-faring nation over the past five decades, with developmental and security dimensions to its space programme and a highly successful space launch vehicle. It had sent a spacecraft to the Moon, and the Mars Orbital Missions had already completed five months in the orbit of Mars. India believed that outer space should not become an arena of conflict but a new and expanding frontier of cooperative activity. India was prepared to consider the revised joint draft Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects presented by Russia and China. While universal and non-discriminatory transparency and confidence-building measures could play a useful complementary role they could not substitute for legally binding instruments. India supported the No First Placement of Weapons in Outer Space resolution but said it was only an interim step and not a substitute for concluding substantive legal measures to ensure the prevention of an arms race in outer space. India supported the resolution on transparency and confidence-building measures but said it was unfortunate that a major space-faring country as India was not included in the Governmental Group of Experts, adding that a more representative Group could have enhanced the content of the report.
Indonesia noted that on 1 July 2013 its Foreign Minister signed in Brunei Darussalam a joint statement with the Foreign Minister of Russia declaring that both countries would not, in any way, be the first to place weapons of any kind in outer space. Indonesia welcomed the joint draft Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects presented by Russia and China. It noted that the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space had carried out an in-depth study on the issue and achieved a positive outcome. All States had a responsibility to refrain from engaging in any activity which could jeopardize the collective goal of maintaining a weapons-free outer space, underlined Indonesia.
For use of the information media; not an official record
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